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18 November 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence  
FROM : Associate Deputy Director for Intelligence  
SUBJECT : Reconnaissance Systems Review

1. Attached is a draft of the issue paper resulting for the joint IC-DoD reconnaissance systems review activity. You will be briefed tomorrow on this activity, and I assume that Admiral Burkhalter has kept you informed. I sat as a member of the Senior Review Panel, but I can add relatively little beyond what is stated in the issue paper.

2. A few observations:

-- The systems enhancement proposed in Alternative II (see figure 2) is aimed at providing some protection to reconnaissance systems against Soviet threats that are considered most likely. They seem like sensible fixes that have been relatively well scrubbed by the NRO and probably are worth the costs involved.

-- The system fixes would be most useful in peacetime and pre-SIOP period. They do not help protect the systems in nuclear war. Consequently, these fixes do not help DoD in its objective to provide some reconnaissance capability in the SIOP and post-SIOP period.

-- The cost of the studies is pretty high [redacted] but hopefully they will allow us to avoid some serious mistakes. The most useful study from my point of view seems to be the review of how to protect ground facilities and harden communications. The value of the other two major studies--threat/requirements and systems applications and mixes (see page 12) is difficult to assess.

3. I recommend that you endorse Alternative II. The next question that will arise will be who will pay, Defense or the NFIP. Clearly you will be asked to provide your share. Presumably the IC Staff has identified some money available in the NFIP. A major question at this point is: What do you give up in the NFIP to reduce the vulnerability of collection systems. Another problem.

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Richard J. Kerr

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